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TAXATION: STATE POSSESSORY INTEREST TAX
Patrick E. Powers, Jr.
Can a county or state acting under state law validly impose
possessory interest tax upon leases of Indian trust land to non-
Indians when the tribe is subject to the Indian Reorganization Act?
Recent federal cases, Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Ber-
nardino' and Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of
Riverside,' hold that an imposition of possessory interest tax on
non-Indian lessees does not violate the Indian Reorganization Act
and is not invalid as being an infringement upon a tribe's right to
govern itself.
Historically, the Federal Constitution referred to "Indians not
taxed."' The Framers of the Constitution, as a general policy, in-
tended that Indians not be taxed. However, certain Indians were.
It developed through history that those Indians who had severed
their tribal relations and moved into the American mainstream of
life were subject to taxation.' These Indians who paid state taxes
were included in the local and federal representative franchise.
Along with the historical concept that not all Indians or Indian
activities are exempt from tax, Congress in 1953 "saw fit" to pass
Public Law 280.' It provides, inter alia, for the extension of state
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country. In addition,
the law specifically provides that the grant of civil jurisdiction
precludes taxation of "any real or personal property... belonging
to any Indian or any Indian tribe".... 6 The Supreme Court held
in Bryan v. Itasca County that Public Law 280 has left traditional
tax immunities intact despite a transfer of civil jurisdiction to cer-
tain states. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co.8 the
Court ruled that there was no tax immunity for non-Indian lessees
prior to the passage of Public Law 280. And in the Fort Mojave
Tribe case, the court said, "Therefore, Public Law 280 provides no
support for the argument that immunity should be extended to
non-Indian lessees of Indian land."' However, the impact of Public
1. 543 F.2d 1253 (1976).
2. 442 F.2d 1184 (1971).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
4. See ExparteCrow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), with regard to Indian severance of tribal
relations.
5. Pub. L. 83-280,28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970).
7. 426 U.S. 373(1976).
8. 336 U.S. 342 (1948).
9. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253, 1257 (1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
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Law 280 will be of continuing importance so far as it affects the ex-
tent t:o which the assumption of such jurisdiction constitutes a
license to tax.
The Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commis-
sion" held that in the absence of congressional consent, states are
preempted from taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income
from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation.
"The court specifically did not deal with 'exertions of state
sovereignty over non-Indians who undertake activity on Indian
reservations'."" To permit non-Indians to enjoy taxation immuni-
ty was held not to be in line with congressional intent in Warren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission.'2
In Williams v. Lee," the Court devised what it called the
"Williams test." Basically, the test is that a state statute is valid if
it does not seriously infringe on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them. Williams held that
"[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always
been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."'" In other
words, the Williams test was designed to resolve the conflict by
providing that the state could protect its interest up to the point
where tribal self-government might be affected. The Supreme
Court reiterated in McClanahan, "In these [conflicts] situations,
both the tribe and State could fairly claim an interest in asserting
their respective jurisdiction,"'" and the Williams test is to be ap-
plied on an individual case-by-case basis.
In spite of the fact that many courts have refused to apply the
Williams test," in Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San
Benardino," the court held that the interference with Indian self-
government by imposing a possessory interest tax on their leases is
not serious enough to involve an issue of state infringement under
the Williams test." The court states that no Indian or Indian land
is being subjected to direct state court process. The only effect of
the tax on the Indians will be the indirect one of perhaps reducing
the revenues they will receive from the leases as a result of their in-
10. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
11. Id. at 1260.
12. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
13. .358 U.S. 217 (1958).
14. Id. at 220.
15. 111 U.S. 164, 179 (1973).
16. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
17. 543 F.2d 1253 (1976).
18. .358 U.S. 217 (1958).
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ability to market a tax exemption, yet such an indirect economic
burden cannot be said to threaten the self-governing ability of the
tribe.'" However, would not this taxing burden indirectly be plac-
ing the Indian lessors at a disadvantage? Sellers must be in an
equal position at the marketplace to be competitive.
The question that must be asked is: Does a reduction of revenue
affect the self-governing ability? An answer by analogy could be if
the Treasury Department of the United States suddenly had com-
petition in collection of taxation revenue from another govern-
ment agency, would that affect Treasury's purpose as the primary
collection department for the nation's funds? Yes, of course it
would. Although the Treasury Department would still be able to
function, it would not have the sole responsibility, and therefore
its ability and purpose would be thwarted or reduced. Tribes
would be put in much the same position.
The court dealt with the plaintiff's "double taxation" assertion
in the Fort Mojave Tribe case by concluding that,
The assertion that "double taxation," resulting from the im-
position of a tax both by the county and the tribe, impairs the
ability of the tribe to levy its tax is not persuasive. There is no
improper double taxation here at all, for the taxes are being
imposed by two different and distinct taxing authorities. The
tribe faces the same problem other taxing agencies confront
when they seek to impose a tax in an area already taxed by
another entity having taxing power. We hold that the uncer-
tain economic burden here imposed on the tribe's ability to
levy a tax does not interfere with their right to self-
government."0
The Court's contention is in line with well-established authority.
Upholding "double taxation" is nothing new to the Supreme
Court.2' The Court upheld the validity of a cigarette sales tax on
reservation sales to non-Indians, while invalidating the imposition
of such a tax on sales to tribe members. When sales were made to
non-Indians, the Court found that it was "the non-Indian con-
sumer or user who saves the tax and reaps the benefits of the tax
exemption."2
19. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253, 1258 (1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
20. Id.
21. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976).
22. Id. at 481.
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A more subtle argument made by the plaintiffs in the Agua
Caliente and Fort Mojave4 cases was that the enforcement of the
tax represented a direct encumbrance on the land. The procedures
available under state law to collect the tax could result in a direct
cloud on their title and an unlawful encumbrance on Indian real
property.' The issue was held moot in Agua Caliente because no
attempt was made to seize or sell any of the property that was en-
cumbered."6 The court artfully dodged the issue. However, in the
Fort Mojave Tribe case, counsel for the Indians gave details of
several situations in which notice of seizure was made and one
case in which the sale was advertised before the lessee finally paid
the tax. Questionably, the court said that there have been no com-
pleted tax sales and it is highly unlikely that any injuries to Indian
rights will occur.27 The reasons given for the court's confidence
with respect to the future were two statutes, Sections 415 and 476
of Title 25 of the United States Code. The first requires the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Interior of any lease of restricted In-
dian lands, while the second explicitly gives the lands. "We have
no reason to believe these sales are contrary to the wishes of the
Secretary and the Indians. These statutes, designed to protect In-
dians, do not render the county powerless to enforce the tax here
involved against the lessee." 8
It is apparent the federal court is evading the issue or placing the
burden on the Secretary of the Interior and the tribes, and this is
unnecessary. Theoretically, the penalty that the state would im-
pose for nonpayment of possessory interest tax, according to the
State Taxation Code, would be a direct encumbrance on the
land.-" This, however, would be an unauthorized encumbrance of
federal lands."5 In addition to dodging this issue, the court also used
circular reasoning in taking the position that the encumbrance
upon the land would never occur because the Secretary of Interior
23. Agua Caliente Band of Mission Ir.dians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184
(1971).
24. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (1976), cert. denied
430 U.S. 983 (1977).
25. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 2951-64 (1974).
26. Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184, 1189
(1971).
27. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 983 (1977).
28. Id. at 1259.
29. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 2951-63 (1974).
30. "Unauthorized" in this sense means not made with consent of Congress or the
Secretary of Interior. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253
(1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
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and tribes would not allow it. But the reason for the Secretary and
the tribes not allowing it is because it is illegal to do so.' Obvious-
ly, if it is illegal to encumber, the Court should act to prevent any
action that could lead to an encumbrance.
In the Fort Mojave Tribe case, the leading case on the issue of
possessory interest tax, the court ignored the encumbrance argu-
ment and held that the California possessory interest tax is valid as
applied to the non-Indian lessees of land within the Fort Mojave
Indian Reservation and the judgment of the district court was af-
firmed. " The petition for certiorari was filed by the counsel for the
Indians on January 24, 1977, and the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari on April 25, 1977."
Although the general rule is that the state is preempted from
taxation as to Indians, applicable federal statutes must be analyzed
in conjunction with Supreme Court cases to determine whether
there is a taxing exception to the general rule. The possessory in-
terest tax is one of these exceptions. The courts have held that a
possessory interest tax is valid as applied to the non-Indian lessees
of land within an Indian reservation, even though this tax will
reduce the tribe's revenue. Furthermore, the fact that a tribe falls
under the Indian Reorganization Act" makes no difference. The
possible encumbrance of the Indian land has not been persuasive
to the courts.
In the Fort Mojave Tribe case, the court appears to make the
mistake of not being able to differentiate between who is paying
the tax and what is being taxed, and hinges its decision on the
former. The plaintiffs are, in reality, indirectly paying the tax by a
smaller return on their leased land.
31. 25 U.S.C. §§ 415,476 (1970).
32. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253, 1259 (1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
33. Id.
34. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970).
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